Modal inferences in science: a tale of two epistemologies.
Recent epistemology of modality has seen a growing trend towards metaphysics-first approaches. Contrastingly, this paper offers a more philosophically modest account of justifying modal claims, focusing on the practices of scientific modal inferences. Two ways of making such inferences are identifie...
| Publicado en: | Synthese Vol. 199; no. 5/6; pp. 13823 - 13844 |
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| Autores principales: | , , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Dec2021
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=154480437&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 154480437 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00397857 4LI jtl: Synthese issn: 00397857 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Dec2021 vid: 199 iid: 5/6 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 154480437 10.1007/s11229-021-03399-8 ppf: 13823 ppct: 21 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 347KB tig: atl: Modal inferences in science: a tale of two epistemologies. aug: au: Hirvonen, Ilmari Koskinen, Rami Pättiniemi, Ilkka affil: Practical Philosophy, University of Helsinki, P.O. Box 24, Unioninkatu 40, 00014, Helsinki, Finland Department of Philosophy, University of Vienna, Universitätsstraße 7, 1010, Vienna, Austria su: Theory of knowledge Model theory sug: subj: Theory of knowledge Model theory keyword: Epistemology of modality Manipulation Necessity Possibility Relative modality Scientific inference ab: Recent epistemology of modality has seen a growing trend towards metaphysics-first approaches. Contrastingly, this paper offers a more philosophically modest account of justifying modal claims, focusing on the practices of scientific modal inferences. Two ways of making such inferences are identified and analyzed: actualist-manipulationist modality (AM) and relative modality (RM). In AM, what is observed to be or not to be the case in actuality or under manipulations, allows us to make modal inferences. AM-based inferences are fallible, but the same holds for practically all empirical inquiry. In RM, modal inferences are evaluated relative to what is kept fixed in a system, like a theory or a model. RM-based inferences are more certain but framework-dependent. While elements from both AM and RM can be found in some existing accounts of modality, it is worth highlighting them in their own right and isolating their features for closer scrutiny. This helps to establish their relevant epistemologies that are free from some strong philosophical assumptions often attached to them in the literature. We close by showing how combining these two routes amounts to a view that accounts for a rich variety of modal inferences in science. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Synthese is a copyright of Springer, 2021. All Rights Reserved. item: Synthese holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2021 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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