Perceptual capacities, discrimination, and the senses.
In this paper, I defend a new theory of the nature and individuation of perceptual capacities. I argue that we need a theory of perceptual capacities to explain modal facts about what sorts of perceptual phenomenal states one can be in. I defend my view by arguing for three adequacy constraints on a...
| Published in: | Synthese Vol. 199; no. 5/6; pp. 14063 - 14086 |
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| Format: | Article |
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Springer Nature
Dec2021
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| Online Access: | View this record in EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=154480448&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 154480448 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00397857 4LI jtl: Synthese issn: 00397857 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Dec2021 vid: 199 iid: 5/6 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 154480448 10.1007/s11229-021-03410-2 ppf: 14063 ppct: 23 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 334KB tig: atl: Perceptual capacities, discrimination, and the senses. aug: au: Hornett, William affil: Department of Philosophy, The University of Sheffield, 45 Victoria Street, S3 7QB, Sheffield, UK su: Differentiation (Cognition) Theory of constraints Individuation (Psychology) sug: subj: Differentiation (Cognition) Theory of constraints Individuation (Psychology) keyword: Molyneux's Question Perceptual capacities Perceptual discrimination Perceptual experience The senses ab: In this paper, I defend a new theory of the nature and individuation of perceptual capacities. I argue that we need a theory of perceptual capacities to explain modal facts about what sorts of perceptual phenomenal states one can be in. I defend my view by arguing for three adequacy constraints on a theory of perceptual capacities: perceptual capacities must be individuated at least partly in terms of their place in a hierarchy of capacities, where these capacities include the senses themselves; an adequate account of perceptual capacities must be sensitive to empirical considerations; and an adequate account should accommodate the nature of the capacity to perceive. I arrive at these constraints by considering how Schellenberg's view fails, before defending and developing my alternative in line with the constraints. I defend a view on which there are few, coarse-grained perceptual capacities which can fulfil complex explanatory roles because they are evaluatively gradable on many axes. Finally, on my view, perceptual capacities bear a particularly close relation to the sensory modalities themselves. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Synthese is a copyright of Springer, 2021. All Rights Reserved. item: Synthese holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2021 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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