Existential dread and the B-theory of time.
In this paper I describe a specific emotional reaction to the fact that we will cease to exist, namely existential dread, and I argue that the B-theory of time, according to which reality contains a four-dimensional spacetime manifold and the present time is metaphysically on a par with past and fut...
| Publicado en: | Synthese Vol. 199; no. 5/6; pp. 14691 - 14709 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Dec2021
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=154480476&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 154480476 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00397857 4LI jtl: Synthese issn: 00397857 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Dec2021 vid: 199 iid: 5/6 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 154480476 10.1007/s11229-021-03439-3 ppf: 14691 ppct: 18 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 298KB tig: atl: Existential dread and the B-theory of time. aug: au: Banfi, Luca affil: University College Dublin, Dublin, Ireland su: Spacetime Emotions Time sug: subj: Spacetime Emotions Time keyword: B-theory of time Ceasing to exist Emotion Existential dread Metaphysics ab: In this paper I describe a specific emotional reaction to the fact that we will cease to exist, namely existential dread, and I argue that the B-theory of time, according to which reality contains a four-dimensional spacetime manifold and the present time is metaphysically on a par with past and future times, cannot accommodate it. Some may see this as an advantage of the B-theory; some may see it as a problem for the view. My aim is not to argue either for or against the B-theory, but merely to show that it is incompatible with a certain common (and important) emotion. The paper is split into three sections. I begin by introducing existential dread. Next, I show how existential dread fits into a widely accepted theory of emotion according to which emotions are intentional states susceptible of being both intelligible and correct, where an emotion is intelligible if, roughly, it makes sense; and is correct if, roughly, it fits its object. The core of the paper is the third section: in that section, I introduce the B-theory of time and I argue that it is incompatible with existential dread. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Synthese is a copyright of Springer, 2021. All Rights Reserved. item: Synthese holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2021 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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