Electoral Competence, Epistocracy, and Standpoint Epistemologies. A Reply to Brennan.
Jason Brennan's recent epistemic argument for epistocracy relies on the assumption that voter competence requires knowledge of economics and political science. He conjectures that people who would qualify as competent are mostly white, upper-middle- to upper-class, educated, employed men, who know b...
| Publicado en: | International Journal of Philosophical Studies Vol. 29; no. 4; pp. 641 - 665 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Taylor & Francis Ltd
Oct2021
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=154582912&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 154582912 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 09672559 5BE jtl: International Journal of Philosophical Studies issn: 09672559 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Oct2021 vid: 29 iid: 4 pid: 377 pub: Taylor & Francis Ltd artinfo: ui: 154582912 10.1080/09672559.2021.1997392 ppf: 641 ppct: 24 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 346KB tig: atl: Electoral Competence, Epistocracy, and Standpoint Epistemologies. A Reply to Brennan. aug: au: Lenczewska, Olga affil: Department of Philosophy and Religion, University of North Carolina, Wilmington, NC, USA su: Brennan, Jason Political competition Feminists Standpoint theory (Communication) Deliberative democracy sug: subj: Brennan, Jason Political competition Feminists Standpoint theory (Communication) Deliberative democracy keyword: deliberative council Epistocracy feminist epistemology group competence political competence restricted suffrage standpoint epistemology standpoint theory voter competence voter ignorance ab: Jason Brennan's recent epistemic argument for epistocracy relies on the assumption that voter competence requires knowledge of economics and political science. He conjectures that people who would qualify as competent are mostly white, upper-middle- to upper-class, educated, employed men, who know better how to promote the interests of the disadvantaged than the disadvantaged themselves. My paper, first, shows that this account of voter competence is too narrow and, second, proposes a modified account of this concept. Brennan mistakenly reasons as though it is obvious that socially disadvantaged and oppressed people, by virtue of lacking sufficient knowledge of political science and economics, do not belong on an epistocratic council. This is because there is another way of being competent: possessing first-personal experience and knowledge unique to (and acquired through) disadvantaged or oppressed situatedness. Once voter competence is characterized accurately and more holistically, epistocracy's problematic implications of privileging already dominant genders, races, and classes, which characterize Brennan's account, no longer arise. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of International Journal of Philosophical Studies is the property of Taylor & Francis Ltd and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: International Journal of Philosophical Studies holder: Taylor & Francis Ltd dt: @attributes: year: 2021 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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