Global Constraints on Imprecise Credences: Solving Reflection Violations, Belief Inertia, and Other Puzzles.
The move to imprecise credence models leaves many formal norms of rationality surprisingly intact, as rational constraints on precise credences are often reinterpreted as constraints on individual elements of a rational agent's representor. However, constraints on imprecise credences needn't take th...
| Published in: | Philosophy & Phenomenological Research Vol. 103; no. 3; pp. 620 - 639 |
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| Format: | Article |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Nov2021
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| Online Access: | View this record in EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=154834419&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 154834419 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318205 PPO jtl: Philosophy & Phenomenological Research issn: 00318205 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Nov2021 vid: 103 iid: 3 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 154834419 10.1111/phpr.12703 ppf: 620 ppct: 19 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 994KB tig: atl: Global Constraints on Imprecise Credences: Solving Reflection Violations, Belief Inertia, and Other Puzzles. aug: su: Reflectance Optical properties Optical reflection Optical bistability Spectral reflectance sug: subj: Reflectance Optical properties Optical reflection Optical bistability Spectral reflectance ab: The move to imprecise credence models leaves many formal norms of rationality surprisingly intact, as rational constraints on precise credences are often reinterpreted as constraints on individual elements of a rational agent's representor. However, constraints on imprecise credences needn't take this form. Whether an imprecise agent is rational might just as easily depend on global features of her representor. This paper is an extended investigation of global rules of rationality. I begin by distinguishing and defining multiple notions of globalness. Then I use these notions to solve several problems faced by fans of imprecise credences. On behalf of fans of imprecise credences, I respond to the problem of belief inertia, according to which certain imprecise agents are unable to engage in inductive learning. In addition, I answer the objection that that imprecise agents are doomed to violate the rational principle of Reflection. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Philosophy & Phenomenological Research is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Philosophy & Phenomenological Research holder: Wiley-Blackwell dt: @attributes: year: 2021 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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