E.T. Jaynes's Solution to the Problem of Countable Additivity.
Philosophers cannot agree on whether the rule of Countable Additivity should be an axiom of probability. Edwin T. Jaynes attacks the problem in a way which is original to him and passed over in the current debate about the principle: he says the debate only arises because of an erroneous use of math...
| Publicado en: | Erkenntnis Vol. 87; no. 1; pp. 287 - 309 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Feb2022
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=154880476&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 154880476 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 01650106 5KZ jtl: Erkenntnis issn: 01650106 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Feb2022 vid: 87 iid: 1 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 154880476 10.1007/s10670-019-00195-2 ppf: 287 ppct: 22 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 353KB tig: atl: E.T. Jaynes's Solution to the Problem of Countable Additivity. aug: au: Elliot, Colin affil: University of Tilburg, Warandelaan 2, 5037 AB, Tilburg, The Netherlands su: Infinity (Mathematics) Philosophers Axioms Probability theory sug: subj: Infinity (Mathematics) Philosophers Axioms Probability theory ab: Philosophers cannot agree on whether the rule of Countable Additivity should be an axiom of probability. Edwin T. Jaynes attacks the problem in a way which is original to him and passed over in the current debate about the principle: he says the debate only arises because of an erroneous use of mathematical infinity. I argue that this solution fails, but I construct a different argument which, I argue, salvages the spirit of the more general point Jaynes makes. I argue that in Jaynes's objective Bayesianism we might have good reasons to adopt Countable Additivity, and some of the major problems this adoption is known to entail need not worry us. In particular, I propose to adopt this new angle on Countable Additivity in Jon Williamson's version of objective Bayesianism. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Erkenntnis is a copyright of Springer, 2022. All Rights Reserved. item: Erkenntnis holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2022 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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