Bivs, Space and 'In'.
I present a novel anti-sceptical BIV argument by focusing on conditions on the production and use of the locative preposition 'in'. I distinguish two uses of 'in'—material and descriptive phenomenological—and I explain in what respect movement is central to the concept that our use of 'in' expresses...
| Publicado en: | Erkenntnis Vol. 87; no. 1; pp. 369 - 393 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Feb2022
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=154880479&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 154880479 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 01650106 5KZ jtl: Erkenntnis issn: 01650106 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Feb2022 vid: 87 iid: 1 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 154880479 10.1007/s10670-019-00198-z ppf: 369 ppct: 24 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 707KB tig: atl: Bivs, Space and 'In'. aug: au: Mac Cumhaill, Clare affil: Durham University, Durham, UK su: Act (Philosophy) Subjectivity Perception (Philosophy) Metaphysics Semantics Prepositions sug: subj: Act (Philosophy) Subjectivity Perception (Philosophy) Metaphysics Semantics Prepositions ab: I present a novel anti-sceptical BIV argument by focusing on conditions on the production and use of the locative preposition 'in'. I distinguish two uses of 'in'—material and descriptive phenomenological—and I explain in what respect movement is central to the concept that our use of 'in' expresses. I go on to argue that a functionalist semantics of the intelligible use of 'in' demands a materialist philosophy of action in the spirit of G.E.M. Anscombe, but also why the structure of space is not irrelevant either; appeal to the structure of space unsettles the causal-empirical assumptions that ground the picture of subjectivity and agency that the biv narrative assumes. Finally, I explain why a functionalist semantics demands a Naïve Realist metaphysics of perception, consistent with some of Putnam's last writings on philosophy of perception. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Erkenntnis is a copyright of Springer, 2022. All Rights Reserved. item: Erkenntnis holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2022 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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