ILLUSION OR DELUSION? A RE‐EXAMINATION OF BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHY OF PERSONAL IDENTITY.
In this article, I argue against the conventional view that Buddhist philosophy of personal identity regards the self as an illusion. Critically engaging the work of Miri Albahari, I defend the view that it is instead centered around the properly diagnostic claim that the overwhelming majority of hu...
| Publicado en: | Zygon: Journal of Religion & Science Vol. 56; no. 4; pp. 846 - 874 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Open Library of Humanities
Dec2021
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=154963136&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 154963136 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 05912385 ZYG jtl: Zygon: Journal of Religion & Science issn: 05912385 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Dec2021 vid: 56 iid: 4 pid: 15576 pub: Open Library of Humanities artinfo: ui: 154963136 10.1111/zygo.12734 ppf: 846 ppct: 28 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: C – @attributes: type: P size: 211KB tig: atl: ILLUSION OR DELUSION? A RE‐EXAMINATION OF BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHY OF PERSONAL IDENTITY. aug: su: Buddhist philosophy Self Delusions Identity (Psychology) Human beings sug: subj: Buddhist philosophy Self Delusions Identity (Psychology) Human beings keyword: Buddhism delusion illusion philosophy of psychiatry ab: In this article, I argue against the conventional view that Buddhist philosophy of personal identity regards the self as an illusion. Critically engaging the work of Miri Albahari, I defend the view that it is instead centered around the properly diagnostic claim that the overwhelming majority of human beings suffer from a delusion concerning the nature of the self. In the central section of the paper, I draw from contemporary work in philosophy of psychiatry to gain clarity on what delusions are and how they are distinct from illusions. On the narrative theory of delusions I thence develop, delusions are best understood as faulty and harm‐inducing self‐referential narrative constructions. Buddhist views on human beings' confusion concerning the self, I then submit, consist of the diagnosis of a delusion in precisely this sense. At the end of the article, I argue that in addition to its intrinsic merits this interpretation has the added advantage of bringing into sharper focus the irreducibly therapeutic character of Buddhist philosophy of personal identity, and I discuss the implications of this for future cross‐cultural research on the problem of selfhood. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Zygon: Journal of Religion & Science is the property of Open Library of Humanities and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Zygon: Journal of Religion & Science holder: Open Library of Humanities dt: @attributes: year: 2021 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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