The Starting-Points for Knowledge: Chrysippus on How to Acquire and Fortify Insecure Apprehension.
This paper examines some neglected Chrysippean fragments on insecure apprehension (κατάληψις). First, I present Chrysippus' account of how non-Sages can begin to fortify their insecure apprehension and upgrade it into knowledge (ἐπιστήμη). Next, I reconstruct Chrysippus' explanation of how sophisms...
| Publicado en: | Phronesis Vol. 67; no. 1; pp. 62 - 99 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Brill Academic Publishers
2022
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| Sumario: | This paper examines some neglected Chrysippean fragments on insecure apprehension (κατάληψις). First, I present Chrysippus' account of how non-Sages can begin to fortify their insecure apprehension and upgrade it into knowledge (ἐπιστήμη). Next, I reconstruct Chrysippus' explanation of how sophisms and counter-arguments lead one to abandon one's insecure apprehension. One such counter-argument originates in the sceptical Academy and targets the Stoic claim that insecure apprehension can be acquired on the basis of custom (συνήθεια). I show how Chrysippus could defend the possibility of custom-based apprehension, while also denying that there is custom-based knowledge. |
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