OBVIOUSLY STRATEGY‐PROOF IMPLEMENTATION OF ASSIGNMENT RULES: A NEW CHARACTERIZATION.
We consider assignment problems where individuals are to be assigned at most one indivisible object and monetary transfers are not allowed. We provide a characterization of assignment rules that are Pareto efficient, nonbossy, and implementable in obviously strategy‐proof (OSP) mechanisms. As coroll...
| Publicado en: | International Economic Review Vol. 63; no. 1; pp. 261 - 291 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Feb2022
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=155130731&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 155130731 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00206598 IER jtl: International Economic Review issn: 00206598 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Feb2022 vid: 63 iid: 1 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 155130731 10.1111/iere.12538 ppf: 261 ppct: 30 formats: tig: atl: OBVIOUSLY STRATEGY‐PROOF IMPLEMENTATION OF ASSIGNMENT RULES: A NEW CHARACTERIZATION. aug: au: Mandal, Pinaki Roy, Souvik affil: Indian Statistical Institute, Kolkata, India su: Business cycles Exchange Assignment problems (Programming) sug: subj: Business cycles Exchange Assignment problems (Programming) ab: We consider assignment problems where individuals are to be assigned at most one indivisible object and monetary transfers are not allowed. We provide a characterization of assignment rules that are Pareto efficient, nonbossy, and implementable in obviously strategy‐proof (OSP) mechanisms. As corollaries of our result, we obtain a characterization of OSP‐implementable fixed priority top trading cycles (FPTTC) rules, hierarchical exchange rules, and trading cycles rules. Troyan (International Economic Review 60 (2019), 1249–61) provides a characterization of OSP‐implementable FPTTC rules when there are equal number of individuals and objects. Our result generalizes this for arbitrary values of those. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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