Are we free to make the laws?

Humeans about laws maintain that laws of nature are nothing over and above the complete distribution of non-modal, categorical properties in spacetime. ‘Humean compatibilists’ argue that if Humeanism about laws is true, then agents in a deterministic world can do otherwise than they are lawfully det...

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Publicado en:Synthese Vol. 200; no. 1; pp. 1 - 17
Autores principales: Loew, Christian, Hüttemann, Andreas
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Springer Nature Feb2022
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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          Loew, Christian
          Hüttemann, Andreas
        affil:
          Umeå Universitet, A, Humanisthuset, 901 87, Umeå, Sweden
          Universität Köln, Albertus Magnus Platz, 50923, Köln, Germany
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        Best systems account
        Compatibilism
        Consequence argument
        Free will
        Humeanism
      ab: Humeans about laws maintain that laws of nature are nothing over and above the complete distribution of non-modal, categorical properties in spacetime. ‘Humean compatibilists’ argue that if Humeanism about laws is true, then agents in a deterministic world can do otherwise than they are lawfully determined to do because of the distinctive nature of Humean laws. More specifically, they reject a central premise of the Consequence argument by maintaining that deterministic laws of nature are ‘up to us’. In this paper, we present a new argument for Humean compatibilism. We argue that Humeans about laws indeed have resources for defending compatibilism that non-Humeans lack (though not for the reasons typically discussed in the literature). Moreover, we show that utilizing these resources does not lead to objectionable consequences. Humeans about laws should thus embrace Humean compatibilism.
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    language: English
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