Moral realism, quasi‐realism and moral steadfastness.
Some moral propositions are so obviously true that we refuse to doubt them, even where we believe that many people disagree. Following Fritz and McPherson, I call our behaviour in such cases 'moral steadfastness'. In this paper, I argue for two metaethical implications of moral steadfastness. I firs...
| Published in: | Ratio Vol. 35; no. 1; pp. 37 - 49 |
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| Format: | Article |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Mar2022
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| Online Access: | View this record in EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=155254343&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 155254343 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00340006 D8S jtl: Ratio issn: 00340006 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Mar2022 vid: 35 iid: 1 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 155254343 10.1111/rati.12322 ppf: 37 ppct: 12 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 289KB tig: atl: Moral realism, quasi‐realism and moral steadfastness. aug: su: Moral realism Perseverance (Ethics) Theory of knowledge Realism sug: subj: Moral realism Perseverance (Ethics) Theory of knowledge Realism keyword: moral epistemology moral realism moral steadfastness quasi‐realism ab: Some moral propositions are so obviously true that we refuse to doubt them, even where we believe that many people disagree. Following Fritz and McPherson, I call our behaviour in such cases 'moral steadfastness'. In this paper, I argue for two metaethical implications of moral steadfastness. I first argue that morally steadfast behaviour is sufficiently prevalent to present an important challenge for some prominent analogies between moral epistemology and non‐moral forms of epistemology. These analogies are often pressed by moral realists. I then argue that moral quasi‐realism, unlike realism, can explain and vindicate our presumption that moral steadfastness is frequently rational. On the assumption that we frequently act as it is rational to act, quasi‐realism is therefore well placed to explain why we are so frequently morally steadfast. I conclude that this is an important respect in which quasi‐realism is explanatorily preferable to realism. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Ratio is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Ratio holder: Wiley-Blackwell dt: @attributes: year: 2022 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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