Predictive minds can think: addressing generality and surface compositionality of thought.
Predictive processing framework (PP) has found wide applications in cognitive science and philosophy. It is an attractive candidate for a unified account of the mind in which perception, action, and cognition fit together in a single model. However, PP cannot claim this role if it fails to accommoda...
| Publicado en: | Synthese Vol. 200; no. 1; pp. 1 - 23 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Feb2022
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=155329155&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 155329155 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00397857 4LI jtl: Synthese issn: 00397857 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Feb2022 vid: 200 iid: 1 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 155329155 10.1007/s11229-022-03502-7 ppf: 1 ppct: 22 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 447KB tig: atl: Predictive minds can think: addressing generality and surface compositionality of thought. aug: au: Rappe, Sofiia affil: Faculty of Philosophy, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Munich, Germany Graduate School of Systemic Neurosciences, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Munich, Germany sug: keyword: Compositionality Conceptual thought Generality Predictive processing Unification ab: Predictive processing framework (PP) has found wide applications in cognitive science and philosophy. It is an attractive candidate for a unified account of the mind in which perception, action, and cognition fit together in a single model. However, PP cannot claim this role if it fails to accommodate an essential part of cognition—conceptual thought. Recently, Williams (Synthese 1–27, 2018) argued that PP struggles to address at least two of thought’s core properties—generality and rich compositionality. In this paper, I show that neither necessarily presents a problem for PP. In particular, I argue that because we do not have access to cognitive processes but only to their conscious manifestations, compositionality may be a manifest property of thought, rather than a feature of the thinking process, and result from the interplay of thinking and language. Pace Williams, both of these capacities, constituting parts of a complex and multifarious cognitive system, may be fully based on the architectural principles of PP. Under the assumption that language presents a subsystem separate from conceptual thought, I sketch out one possible way for PP to accommodate both generality and rich compositionality. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Synthese is a copyright of Springer, 2022. All Rights Reserved. item: Synthese holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2022 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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