Disagreement in philosophy.

Recent philosophical discussions construe disagreement as epistemically unsettling. On learning that a peer disagrees, it is said, you should suspend judgment, lower your credence, or dismiss your peer’s conviction as somehow flawed, even if you can neither identify the flaw nor explain why you thin...

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Publicado en:Synthese Vol. 200; no. 1; pp. 1 - 17
Autor principal: Elgin, Catherine Z.
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Springer Nature Feb2022
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        au: Elgin, Catherine Z.
        affil: Graduate School of Education, Harvard University, 02138, Cambridge, MA, USA
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      keyword:
        Disagreement
        Epistemic acceptance
        Philosophy
        Understanding
      ab: Recent philosophical discussions construe disagreement as epistemically unsettling. On learning that a peer disagrees, it is said, you should suspend judgment, lower your credence, or dismiss your peer’s conviction as somehow flawed, even if you can neither identify the flaw nor explain why you think she is the party in error. Philosophers do none of these things. A distinctive feature of philosophy as currently practiced is that, although we marshal the strongest arguments we can devise, we do not expect others to agree. Nor are we dismayed then they do not. Through a survey of familiar professional practices, I argue that philosophy rightly revels in responsible disagreement. This discloses important and perhaps surprising facets of the epistemology of philosophy.
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    language: English
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