On an Alleged Loophole in Causal Closure: A Reply to Gamper.
This paper intends to critically consider the idea put forward by Johan Gamper (Philosophia 45: 631–636, 2017) that the principle of causal closure can be reconciled with the possibility of pluralism. This idea is based on redefining causal closure and on the introduction of so-called interfaces bet...
| Published in: | Philosophia Vol. 50; no. 1; pp. 1 - 7 |
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| Main Authors: | , |
| Format: | Article |
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Springer Nature
Mar2022
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | View this record in EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=155465988&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 155465988 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00483893 1VPF jtl: Philosophia issn: 00483893 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Mar2022 vid: 50 iid: 1 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 155465988 10.1007/s11406-021-00361-3 ppf: 1 ppct: 6 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 503KB tig: atl: On an Alleged Loophole in Causal Closure: A Reply to Gamper. aug: au: Berber, Andrea Đorđević, Strahinja affil: Institute for Philosophy, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Belgrade, Čika-Ljubina 18-20, 11000, Beograd, Serbia su: Ontology Perplexity (Philosophy) Pluralism Argument Reason sug: subj: Ontology Perplexity (Philosophy) Pluralism Argument Reason keyword: Causal closure First cause problem Interface Loophole causal closure Scientific ontology ab: This paper intends to critically consider the idea put forward by Johan Gamper (Philosophia 45: 631–636, 2017) that the principle of causal closure can be reconciled with the possibility of pluralism. This idea is based on redefining causal closure and on the introduction of so-called interfaces between the universes. By reconstructing and analyzing the author's argumentative steps, we will try to show that this approach is methodologically and explanatory unfounded. Firstly, this way of redefining the principle of causal closure is inconsistent with the very reasons why this principle was introduced. Secondly, the proposed view does not bring the explanatory benefits it promises, that is, it cannot solve difficulties such as the problem of the first cause. Moreover, the position itself produces many additional concerns and perplexities that remain unresolved. The conclusion of our analysis is that certain aspects of the proposed position may be sustainable and plausible, but only if novel arguments should be offered. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Philosophia is a copyright of Springer, 2022. All Rights Reserved. item: Philosophia holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2022 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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