Dirty Hands and Moral Conflict – Lessons from the Philosophy of Evil.

According to one understanding of the problem of dirty hands, every case of dirty hands is an instance of moral conflict, but not every instance of moral conflict is a case of dirty hands. So, what sets the two apart? The dirty hands literature has offered widely different answers to this question b...

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Publicado en:Philosophia Vol. 50; no. 1; pp. 183 - 201
Autor principal: Nick, Christina
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Springer Nature Mar2022
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        atl: Dirty Hands and Moral Conflict – Lessons from the Philosophy of Evil.
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        au: Nick, Christina
        affil: Inter-Disciplinary Ethics Applied Centre, University of Leeds, Leeds, UK
      su:
        Good & evil
        Values (Ethics)
        Conception
        Qualitative research
        Betrayal
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        subj:
          Good & evil
          Values (Ethics)
          Conception
          Qualitative research
          Betrayal
      keyword:
        Concept distinctness
        Dirty hands
        Evil
        Moral conflict
      ab: According to one understanding of the problem of dirty hands, every case of dirty hands is an instance of moral conflict, but not every instance of moral conflict is a case of dirty hands. So, what sets the two apart? The dirty hands literature has offered widely different answers to this question but there has been relatively little discussion about their relative merits as well as challenges. In this paper I evaluate these different accounts by making clear which understanding of concept distinctness underlies them and which of them is, ultimately, the most plausible one in the case of dirty hands and ordinary moral conflict. In order to do so, I will borrow from the terminology employed in recent debates in the philosophy of evil which have tackled a similar problem to the one at hand, i.e. defining what sets evil apart from ordinary wrongdoing. Here it has been argued that concepts could be distinct in three ways: they can have a quantitative difference, a strong qualitative or a moderate qualitative difference. I conclude that the most convincing definition of dirty hands draws a moderate qualitative distinction between ordinary moral conflict according to which dirty hands are those moral conflicts that involve a serious violation or betrayal of a core moral value.
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    language: English
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