The ins and outs of conscious belief.
What should advocates of phenomenal intentionality say about unconscious intentional states? I approach this question by focusing on a recent debate between Tim Crane and David Pitt, about the nature of belief. Crane argues that beliefs are never conscious. Pitt, concerned that the phenomenal intent...
| Publicado en: | Philosophical Studies Vol. 179; no. 2; pp. 517 - 549 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Feb2022
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=155466621&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 155466621 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318116 4L8 jtl: Philosophical Studies issn: 00318116 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Feb2022 vid: 179 iid: 2 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 155466621 10.1007/s11098-021-01669-2 ppf: 517 ppct: 32 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 362KB tig: atl: The ins and outs of conscious belief. aug: au: Coleman, Sam affil: Department of Philosophy, University of Hertfordshire, AL10 9AB, Hatfield, Hertfordshire, UK su: Consciousness Belief & doubt Qualia Thought & thinking Intentionality (Philosophy) sug: subj: Consciousness Belief & doubt Qualia Thought & thinking Intentionality (Philosophy) keyword: Belief Intentionality Phenomenal intentionality Stream of consciousness Thought Unconscious content ab: What should advocates of phenomenal intentionality say about unconscious intentional states? I approach this question by focusing on a recent debate between Tim Crane and David Pitt, about the nature of belief. Crane argues that beliefs are never conscious. Pitt, concerned that the phenomenal intentionality thesis coupled with a commitment to beliefs as essentially unconscious embroils Crane in positing unconscious phenomenology, counter-argues that beliefs are essentially conscious. I examine and rebut Crane's arguments for the essential unconsciousness of beliefs, some of which are widely endorsed. On the way I sketch a model of how belief states could participate in the stream of consciousness. I then consider Pitt's position, arguing in reply, along Freudian lines, that we should posit not just dispositional but occurrent unconscious beliefs. This result, I argue, indeed requires advocates of phenomenal intentionality to posit unconscious qualia to fix these unconscious occurrent thoughts, and I defend the coherence of the notion of unconscious qualia against some common attacks. Ultimately, I claim, the combination of taking seriously the occurrent unconscious, and a commitment to phenomenal intentionality, should lead us to expand William James's conception of the stream of consciousness to encompass, additionally, a stream of unconscious mental life—or, perhaps better, to posit a single partly conscious partly unconscious qualia-stream of mental goings-on. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Philosophical Studies is a copyright of Springer, 2022. All Rights Reserved. item: Philosophical Studies holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2022 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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