Existence and Believability.
This paper argues that true singular existentials are rationally indubitable. After the claim is clarified and motivated (Section 1), it is defended against objections inspired by Cartesian skepticism and semantic externalism (Section 2), a Fregean fine‐grained conception of propositional content (S...
| Publicado en: | Pacific Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 103; no. 1; pp. 2 - 39 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Mar2022
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=155484851&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 155484851 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 02790750 PHZ jtl: Pacific Philosophical Quarterly issn: 02790750 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Mar2022 vid: 103 iid: 1 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 155484851 10.1111/papq.12392 ppf: 2 ppct: 37 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 298KB tig: atl: Existence and Believability. aug: su: Certainty Skepticism A priori Motivation (Psychology) sug: subj: Certainty Skepticism A priori Motivation (Psychology) ab: This paper argues that true singular existentials are rationally indubitable. After the claim is clarified and motivated (Section 1), it is defended against objections inspired by Cartesian skepticism and semantic externalism (Section 2), a Fregean fine‐grained conception of propositional content (Section 3), Kripke's causal theory of reference (Section 4), a Stalnakerian coarse‐grained conception of propositional content (Section 5), as well as Evans's account of descriptive reference fixing (Section 6). The discussion is brought to a close by concluding that either true singular existentials are a priori or apriority is not necessary for rational indubitability (Section 7). pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Pacific Philosophical Quarterly is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Pacific Philosophical Quarterly holder: Wiley-Blackwell dt: @attributes: year: 2022 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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