Disagreement without discovery and the epistemological argument for freedom from poverty.
In this paper, I develop an epistemological argument for freedom from poverty, building on Gerald Gaus’ work on political and moral disagreement in New Diversity Theory (NDT). NDT argues that diversity and disagreement are fundamental to political and moral learning. In this paper, I address Gaus’ c...
| Publicado en: | Synthese Vol. 200; no. 1; pp. 1 - 17 |
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| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Feb2022
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=155641238&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 155641238 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00397857 4LI jtl: Synthese issn: 00397857 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Feb2022 vid: 200 iid: 1 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 155641238 10.1007/s11229-022-03490-8 ppf: 1 ppct: 16 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 777KB tig: atl: Disagreement without discovery and the epistemological argument for freedom from poverty. aug: au: Zubčić, Marko-Luka affil: Center for Advanced Studies South East Europe, University of Rijeka, Rijeka, Croatia sug: keyword: Disagreement Diversity Institutional design Moral learning Political epistemology Poverty ab: In this paper, I develop an epistemological argument for freedom from poverty, building on Gerald Gaus’ work on political and moral disagreement in New Diversity Theory (NDT). NDT argues that diversity and disagreement are fundamental to political and moral learning. In this paper, I address Gaus’ central arguments in NDT, and focus on what I argue to be the key epistemological distinction of his account—namely, the argument that the relevant diversity, which is conducive to political and moral learning and should therefore be protected by an institutional order, should not be defended or defined by reference to its performance with regards to discovery of true beliefs, but by reference to the independent epistemic value of protection of disagreeing, redundant and distant investigators. I develop a restatement of this argument from the perspective of institutional epistemology, and show that (along with constitutional liberties, polycentric self-governance and markets) freedom from poverty must be considered an institutional “device” conducive to such a conception of diversity. While Gaus rejects redistributive policies at the level of an institutional order, it is precisely his account of the epistemic powers of diversity and disagreement which provides the strongest defense of minimal redistribution. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Synthese is a copyright of Springer, 2022. All Rights Reserved. item: Synthese holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2022 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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