The semantic view of computation and the argument from the cognitive science practice.
According to the semantic view of computation, computations cannot be individuated without invoking semantic properties. A traditional argument for the semantic view is what we shall refer to as the argument from the cognitive science practice. In its general form, this argument rests on the idea th...
| Publicado en: | Synthese Vol. 200; no. 2; pp. 1 - 30 |
|---|---|
| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Springer Nature
Apr2022
|
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=155669760&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 155669760 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00397857 4LI jtl: Synthese issn: 00397857 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Apr2022 vid: 200 iid: 2 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 155669760 10.1007/s11229-022-03542-z ppf: 1 ppct: 29 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 338KB tig: atl: The semantic view of computation and the argument from the cognitive science practice. aug: au: Calzavarini, Fabrizio Paternoster, Alfredo affil: Department of Letter, Philosophy, Communication, University of Bergamo, Via Pignolo 76, 20124, Bergamo, Italy Center for Logic, Language, and Cognition, University of Turin, Turin, Italy sug: keyword: Cognitive science Compuation Formal syntactic Individuation Neural computation Semantics ab: According to the semantic view of computation, computations cannot be individuated without invoking semantic properties. A traditional argument for the semantic view is what we shall refer to as the argument from the cognitive science practice. In its general form, this argument rests on the idea that, since cognitive scientists describe computations (in explanations and theories) in semantic terms, computations are individuated semantically. Although commonly invoked in the computational literature, the argument from the cognitive science practice has never been discussed in detail. In this paper, we shall provide a critical reconstruction of this argument and an extensive analysis of its prospects, taking into account some ways of defending it that have never been explored so far. We shall argue that explanatory considerations support at best a weak version of the argument from the cognitive science practice, according to which semantic properties concur with formal syntactic properties in individuating computations in cognitive science, but not a strong version, according to which computation individuation in cognitive science is semantic as opposed to formal syntactic. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Synthese is a copyright of Springer, 2022. All Rights Reserved. item: Synthese holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2022 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
|---|