Moral blame and rational criticism.
A central issue in practical philosophy concerns the relation between moral blameworthiness and normative reasons. As there has been little of direct exchange between the debate on reasons and the debate on blameworthiness, this topic has not received the attention it deserves. In this paper, I cons...
| Publicado en: | European Journal of Philosophy Vol. 30; no. 1; pp. 345 - 361 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Mar2022
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=155808234&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 155808234 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 09668373 7PU jtl: European Journal of Philosophy issn: 09668373 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Mar2022 vid: 30 iid: 1 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 155808234 10.1111/ejop.12646 ppf: 345 ppct: 16 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 1.3MB tig: atl: Moral blame and rational criticism. aug: su: Responsibility Metaethics Reason Debate Williams, Bernard, 1929-2003 sug: subj: Responsibility Metaethics Reason Debate Williams, Bernard, 1929-2003 ab: A central issue in practical philosophy concerns the relation between moral blameworthiness and normative reasons. As there has been little of direct exchange between the debate on reasons and the debate on blameworthiness, this topic has not received the attention it deserves. In this paper, I consider two notions about blameworthiness and reasons that are fundamental in respective field. The two notions might seem incontrovertible when considered individually, but I argue that they together entail claims that are highly contentious. In particular, I maintain that they entail unreasonable and contradictory claims since the practices of moral blame and rational criticism diverge with regard to three dimensions: justification, response, and function. Thus, we need to give up one of the principal notions. The solutions to this puzzle suggest that the connection between reasons and rationality is weaker than standardly presumed in metaethics. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of European Journal of Philosophy is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: European Journal of Philosophy holder: Wiley-Blackwell dt: @attributes: year: 2022 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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