The real problem of pure reason.

The problem of Kant's first Critique is the problem of pure reason: how are synthetic judgments possible a priori? Many of his readers have believed that the problem depends upon a delimitation within the class of a priori truths of a class of irreducibly synthetic truths—a delimitation whose possib...

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Publicado en:European Journal of Philosophy Vol. 30; no. 1; pp. 45 - 64
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Wiley-Blackwell Mar2022
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Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        atl: The real problem of pure reason.
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        Kant, Immanuel, 1724-1804
        Metaphysics
        Cognition
        Philosophers
        Interlocutory decisions
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        subj:
          Kant, Immanuel, 1724-1804
          Metaphysics
          Cognition
          Philosophers
          Interlocutory decisions
      ab: The problem of Kant's first Critique is the problem of pure reason: how are synthetic judgments possible a priori? Many of his readers have believed that the problem depends upon a delimitation within the class of a priori truths of a class of irreducibly synthetic truths—a delimitation whose possibility is doubtful—because absent this it is not excluded that all a priori truths are analytic. I argue, on the contrary, that the problem depends on nothing more than the human knower's everyday consciousness of her own finitude: her dependence in thinking and knowing on what is given to her. The problem is a difficulty about how the concepts which figure in metaphysical judgments could represent reality given that they cannot do so in the way in which concepts figuring in empirical judgments do. Empirical judgment here functions as exemplary of thought and knowledge because it is exemplary of finite thought and knowledge. Mere analysis could not, therefore, dissolve the problem even in principle, because to say that a concept can be analyzed is not yet to explain the possibility of its real representative power. The significance of the analytic‐synthetic distinction in the context of the problem of pure reason is that its formulation allows Kant to say this.
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