Term Limits and Environmental Treaty Commitments.
How does political accountability in democracies affect leaders' incentives for international cooperation? We consider how term limits should affect international environmental agreement (IEA) participation. Pursuing environmental protection as a public good coincides with the political survival inc...
| Publicado en: | International Studies Quarterly Vol. 66; no. 1; pp. 1 - 15 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Oxford University Press / USA
Mar2022
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=155812657&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 155812657 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00208833 ISQ jtl: International Studies Quarterly issn: 00208833 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Mar2022 vid: 66 iid: 1 pid: 622 pub: Oxford University Press / USA artinfo: ui: 155812657 10.1093/isq/sqab072 ppf: 1 ppct: 14 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T db: hlh ui: 155812657 – @attributes: type: P db: hlh ui: 155812657 tig: atl: Term Limits and Environmental Treaty Commitments. aug: au: DiLorenzo, Matthew Stone, Talor affil: Old Dominion University , USA su: Political accountability Democracy International cooperation Environmental protection Leaders sug: subj: Political accountability Democracy International cooperation Environmental protection Leaders ab: How does political accountability in democracies affect leaders' incentives for international cooperation? We consider how term limits should affect international environmental agreement (IEA) participation. Pursuing environmental protection as a public good coincides with the political survival incentives of democratic leaders. Term limits decouple leaders' policy priorities from their political survival incentives, discouraging IEA participation. However, prioritization of environmental concerns increases with economic development. As such, the effect of term limits on IEA participation should be strongest in rich democracies. We test these arguments using data from the International Environmental Agreements Database from 1970 to 2011. Democratic leaders, particularly in rich democracies, sign fewer IEAs when freed from the reelection motive. We also consider the potential that term limits could favor IEA participation if doing so aligns with a leader's preferences. This potential should be greatest in poor democracies where citizens place less emphasis on environmental protection, though we find little evidence for this expectation. The findings have important implications for understanding the determinants of IEA participation and the political accountability–international cooperation relationship. Whereas some argue that electoral incentives that cause leaders to favor present over future concerns undermine environmental cooperation, our results suggest that political accountability in democracies can promote treaty participation. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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