The Intermediate Scope of Consciousness in the Predictive Mind.
There is a view on consciousness that has strong intuitive appeal and empirical support: the intermediate-level theory of consciousness, proposed mainly by Ray Jackendoff and by Jesse Prinz. This theory identifies a specific "intermediate" level of representation as the basis of human phenomenal con...
| Publicado en: | Erkenntnis Vol. 87; no. 2; pp. 891 - 913 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Springer Nature
Apr2022
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=155887857&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 155887857 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 01650106 5KZ jtl: Erkenntnis issn: 01650106 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Apr2022 vid: 87 iid: 2 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 155887857 10.1007/s10670-020-00222-7 ppf: 891 ppct: 22 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 560KB tig: atl: The Intermediate Scope of Consciousness in the Predictive Mind. aug: au: Marchi, Francesco Hohwy, Jakob affil: Institut für Philosophie II, Ruhr University Bochum, Universitätsstrasse 150, Room GAFO 04/620, 44780, Bochum, Germany Cognition and Philosophy Lab, Philosophy Department, School of Philosophical, Historical and International Studies, Monash University, 20 Chancellors Walk, Room E674, 3800, Clayton, VIC, Australia su: Cognition Mental representation Virtues sug: subj: Cognition Mental representation Virtues ab: There is a view on consciousness that has strong intuitive appeal and empirical support: the intermediate-level theory of consciousness, proposed mainly by Ray Jackendoff and by Jesse Prinz. This theory identifies a specific "intermediate" level of representation as the basis of human phenomenal consciousness, which sits between high-level non-perspectival thought processes and low-level disjointed feature-detection processes in the perceptual and cognitive processing hierarchy. In this article, we show that the claim that consciousness arises at an intermediate-level is true of some cognitive systems, but only in virtue of specific constraints on their active interactions with the environment. We provide ecological reasons for why certain processing levels in a cognitive hierarchy are privileged with respect to consciousness. We do this from the perspective of a prediction-error minimization model of perception and cognition, relying especially on the notion of active inference: the privileged level for consciousness depends on the specific dispositions of an organism concerned with inferring its policies for action. Such a level is indeed intermediate for humans, but this depends on the spatiotemporal resolution of the typical actions that a human organism can normally perform. Thus, intermediateness is not an essential feature of consciousness. In organisms with different action dispositions the privileged level or levels may differ as well. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Erkenntnis is a copyright of Springer, 2022. All Rights Reserved. item: Erkenntnis holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2022 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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