Degrees of Assertability.
In considering what we ought to say, we can evaluate a proposition both for whether it is assertable and for how assertable it is. The latter notion, that of comparative assertability, has an important role to play, both in our epistemic evaluations of speech and in our pragmatic reasoning. Yet, des...
| Published in: | Philosophy & Phenomenological Research Vol. 104; no. 1; pp. 19 - 50 |
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| Format: | Article |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Jan2022
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| Online Access: | View this record in EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=156030525&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 156030525 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318205 PPO jtl: Philosophy & Phenomenological Research issn: 00318205 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Jan2022 vid: 104 iid: 1 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 156030525 10.1111/phpr.12725 ppf: 19 ppct: 31 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: C – @attributes: type: P size: 1.6MB tig: atl: Degrees of Assertability. aug: su: Epistemics Pragmatics Probabilism Operational definitions Probability theory sug: subj: Epistemics Pragmatics Probabilism Operational definitions Probability theory ab: In considering what we ought to say, we can evaluate a proposition both for whether it is assertable and for how assertable it is. The latter notion, that of comparative assertability, has an important role to play, both in our epistemic evaluations of speech and in our pragmatic reasoning. Yet, despite this, it has received little prior discussion. This paper takes up the investigation of comparative assertability. §§1–2 provide a preliminary, informal overview of the topic and an operationalization of the target notion. §3 introduces Probabilism, the thesis that a proposition's degree of assertability is determined by its probability. Probabilism has been assumed in much of what prior discussion on comparative assertability there is. In §4 I present two kinds of problem for Probabilism—problems which, I suggest, when taken in combination, should lead us to look for alternatives. In §5, I formulate and defend one such alternative. Under this proposal, comparative assertability is a matter, not of comparative probability, but of comparative normality. I conclude by demonstrating how adopting this approach allows us to avoid both kinds of problem which beset Probabilism. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Philosophy & Phenomenological Research is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Philosophy & Phenomenological Research holder: Wiley-Blackwell dt: @attributes: year: 2022 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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