Loss aversion in asymmetric anti‐coordination games.
This paper studies theoretically and experimentally how the possibility of a negative payoff to one player in 2‐by‐2 hawk‐dove games affects the strategic behavior of both players. Exposing column players to a possibility of negative payoff allows us to examine if row players can anticipate the colu...
| Publicado en: | Southern Economic Journal Vol. 88; no. 4; pp. 1549 - 1574 |
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| Autores principales: | , , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Apr2022
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=156163629&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 156163629 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00384038 SEJ jtl: Southern Economic Journal issn: 00384038 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Apr2022 vid: 88 iid: 4 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 156163629 10.1002/soej.12563 ppf: 1549 ppct: 25 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 2.4MB tig: atl: Loss aversion in asymmetric anti‐coordination games. aug: au: Wen, Yuanji Masschelein, Stijn Ratan, Anmol affil: Accounting and Finance, UWA Business School, University of Western Australia, Perth Western Australia,, Australia Department of Economics, Monash University, Clayton Victoria,, Australia su: Games Loss aversion Strategy games Treatment effectiveness sug: subj: Games Doll, Toy, and Game Manufacturing Hobby, Toy, and Game Stores Toy and Hobby Goods and Supplies Merchant Wholesalers Loss aversion Strategy games Treatment effectiveness keyword: asymmetric hawk‐dove games level‐k model loss aversion reference point asymmetric hawk‐dove games level‐k model loss aversion reference point ab: This paper studies theoretically and experimentally how the possibility of a negative payoff to one player in 2‐by‐2 hawk‐dove games affects the strategic behavior of both players. Exposing column players to a possibility of negative payoff allows us to examine if row players can anticipate the column players' loss aversion. A level‐k model with loss averse agents predicts treatment effects across two versions of hawk‐dove games with and without losses. Our data support a direct effect of loss aversion and fail to support the anticipation of loss aversion. Specifically, the column players in the treatment group are more likely to play Dove when they face losses; while, only few untreated participants acting as row players seem to anticipate such increased propensity of choosing Dove by their opponents. Further, a time effect is documented and found to be explained by increases in participants' depths of strategic reasoning over time. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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