Same-tracking real kinds in the social sciences.

The kinds of real or natural kinds that support explanation and prediction in the social sciences are difficult to identify and track because they change through time, intersect with one another, and they do not always exhibit their properties when one encounters them. As a result, conceptual practi...

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Publicado en:Synthese Vol. 200; no. 2; pp. 1 - 11
Autor principal: Bach, Theodore
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Springer Nature Apr2022
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        atl: Same-tracking real kinds in the social sciences.
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        au: Bach, Theodore
        affil: Firelands College, Bowling Green State University, Bowling Green, OH, United States
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      keyword:
        Ameliorative strategy
        Boyd
        Conceptual engineering
        Millikan
        Natural kinds
        Reference
        Social ontology
      ab: The kinds of real or natural kinds that support explanation and prediction in the social sciences are difficult to identify and track because they change through time, intersect with one another, and they do not always exhibit their properties when one encounters them. As a result, conceptual practices directed at these kinds will often refer in ways that are partial, equivocal, or redundant. To improve this epistemic situation, it is important to employ open-ended classificatory concepts, to understand when different research programs are tracking the same real kind, and to maintain an ongoing commitment to interact causally with real kinds to focus reference on those kinds. A tempting view of these non-idealized epistemic conditions should be avoided: that they signal an ontological structure of the social world so plentiful that it would permit ameliorated (norm-driven, conceptually engineered) classificatory schemes to achieve their normative aims regardless of whether they defer (in ways to be described) to real-kind classificatory schemes. To ground these discussions, the essay appeals to an overlooked convergence in the systematic naturalistic frameworks of Richard Boyd and Ruth Millikan.
      pubtype: Academic Journal
      doctype: Article
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    language: English
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