Invariance, intrinsicality and perspicuity.
It is now standard to interpret symmetry-related models of physical theories as representing the same state of affairs. Recently, a debate has sprung up around the question when this interpretational move is warranted. In particular, Møller-Nielsen (Philos Sci 84(5):1253–1264, 2017) has argued that...
| Publicado en: | Synthese Vol. 200; no. 2; pp. 1 - 19 |
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| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Springer Nature
Apr2022
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=156259921&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 156259921 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00397857 4LI jtl: Synthese issn: 00397857 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Apr2022 vid: 200 iid: 2 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 156259921 10.1007/s11229-022-03682-2 ppf: 1 ppct: 18 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 302KB tig: atl: Invariance, intrinsicality and perspicuity. aug: au: Jacobs, Caspar affil: University of Pittsburgh, 1101 Cathedral of Learning, 15260, Pittsburgh, PA, USA sug: keyword: Intrinsicality Invariance Motivationalism Perspicuity Sophistication Symmetries ab: It is now standard to interpret symmetry-related models of physical theories as representing the same state of affairs. Recently, a debate has sprung up around the question when this interpretational move is warranted. In particular, Møller-Nielsen (Philos Sci 84(5):1253–1264, 2017) has argued that one is only allowed to interpret symmetry-related models as physically equivalent when one has a characterisation of their common content. I disambiguate two versions of this claim. On the first, a perspicuous interpretation is required: an account of the models’ common ontology. On the second, stricter, version of this claim, a perspicuous formalism is required in addition: one whose mathematical structures ‘intrinsically’ represent the physical world, in the sense of Field (Science without numbers: a defence of nominalism, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1980). Using Dewar’s (Br J Philos Sci 70(2):485–521, 2019) distinction between internal and external sophistication as a case study, I argue that the second requirement is decisive. This clarifies the conditions under which it is warranted to interpret symmetry-related models as physically equivalent. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Synthese is a copyright of Springer, 2022. All Rights Reserved. item: Synthese holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2022 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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