Making us Autonomous: The Enactive Normativity of Morality.
Any complete account of morality should be able to account for its characteristic normativity; we show that enactivism is able to do so while doing justice to the situated and interactive nature of morality. Moral normativity primarily arises in interpersonal interaction and is characterized by agen...
| Publicado en: | Topoi: An International Review of Philosophy Vol. 41; no. 2; pp. 257 - 275 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Apr2022
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=156400330&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 156400330 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 01677411 NM2 jtl: Topoi: An International Review of Philosophy issn: 01677411 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Apr2022 vid: 41 iid: 2 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 156400330 10.1007/s11245-022-09795-0 ppf: 257 ppct: 18 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 738KB tig: atl: Making us Autonomous: The Enactive Normativity of Morality. aug: au: Pescador Canales, Cassandra Mojica, Laura affil: Posgrado en Filosofía de la Ciencia, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (UNAM), 04510, CDMX, México División Ciencias Sociales y Humanidades, Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana, Cuajimalpa (UAM-C), 05300, CDMX, México Embodied Cognitive Science Unit, Okinawa Institute of Science and Technology (OIST), Okinawa, Japan su: Normativity (Ethics) Ethics Social interaction Possibility Patient autonomy sug: subj: Normativity (Ethics) Ethics Social interaction Possibility Patient autonomy keyword: Autonomy Cognition Heteronomy Moral normativity Phenomenology ab: Any complete account of morality should be able to account for its characteristic normativity; we show that enactivism is able to do so while doing justice to the situated and interactive nature of morality. Moral normativity primarily arises in interpersonal interaction and is characterized by agents' possibility of irrevocably changing each other's autonomies, that is, the possibility of harming or expanding each other's autonomy. We defend that moral normativity, as opposed to social and other forms of normativity, regulates and, in some cases, constitutes this very possibility. Agents are thus morally responsible for caring about their own and others' autonomies in interaction. In our conception, moral normativity is embodied, situated, and deeply affective, and is constituted in social practices and maintained in interaction. We identify at least two necessary conditions for moral normativity to arise as a social practice. The first is our embodied constitution as living beings who are precarious and therefore vulnerable and in need of interaction with others and with the environment. The second is our sociolinguistic nature, which allows us to exponentially expand our possibilities for action and normatively distinguish among them. We finish by drawing a distinction between moral character and the moral content of interactions, which allows us to universally recognize the ethical dimensions of all human interaction while doing justice to the situated character of morals. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Topoi: An International Review of Philosophy is a copyright of Springer, 2022. All Rights Reserved. item: Topoi: An International Review of Philosophy holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2022 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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