Intellectual Humility with Partial Application.

Intellectual humility plays a crucial role among intellectual virtues. It has attracted considerable attention from virtue epistemologists, who have offered a fair number of treatments. In this essay, I argue that, regardless of the difference among these treatments, they are beset by two problems:...

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Publicado en:Philosophia Vol. 50; no. 2; pp. 437 - 450
Autor principal: Di Ceglie, Roberto
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Springer Nature Apr2022
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        au: Di Ceglie, Roberto
        affil: Pontificia Università Lateranense, Rome, Italy
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        Humility
        Theory of knowledge
        Autopoiesis
        Snobs & snobbishness
        Megalomania
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          Humility
          Theory of knowledge
          Autopoiesis
          Snobs & snobbishness
          Megalomania
      keyword:
        Circular argument
        Duncan Pritchard
        Hinge commitments
        Noetic structure
        Self-referential contradiction
        Virtue epistemology
      ab: Intellectual humility plays a crucial role among intellectual virtues. It has attracted considerable attention from virtue epistemologists, who have offered a fair number of treatments. In this essay, I argue that, regardless of the difference among these treatments, they are beset by two problems: (1) they fall into a circular argument; (2) they fall into a self-referential contradiction. I then argue that a recent proposal by D. Pritchard allows us to avoid (1), but not (2). However, by combining this proposal with another reflection advanced by the same author while he discusses the Wittgensteinian notion of hinge commitments, it is possible to avoid (2). The thesis that emerges is that only a partial application of intellectual humility solves (2). Finally, I reinforce this thesis by rejecting an alternative solution to (2).
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