Can thoughts be read from the brain? Neuroscience Contra Wittgenstein.

Wittgenstein wrote: “No supposition seems to me more natural than that there is no process in the brain correlated with associating or with thinking; so that it would be impossible to read off thought-processes from brain processes.” In general, he rejects what he calls “psycho-physical parallelism....

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Publicado en:Synthese Vol. 200; no. 3; pp. 1 - 26
Autor principal: Wenzel, Christian Helmut
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Springer Nature Jun2022
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        au: Wenzel, Christian Helmut
        affil: Department of Philosophy, National Taiwan University, 10617, Taipei, Taiwan R.O.C.
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      keyword:
        Brain
        Meaning
        Neuroscience
        Thought
        Wittgenstein
      ab: Wittgenstein wrote: “No supposition seems to me more natural than that there is no process in the brain correlated with associating or with thinking; so that it would be impossible to read off thought-processes from brain processes.” In general, he rejects what he calls “psycho-physical parallelism.” In Sect. 1, I explain Wittgenstein’s position on this topic and how his followers defend it. In Sect. 2, I argue against Wittgenstein, contending that there is “thought” in a wider sense and that it can be “manifested” without expression. Thought does not need to be ordinarily expressed or even expressible, and it can be read off from the brain, provided one has sufficient technology, data, and understanding of the subject’s interaction with the environment. In Sect. 3, I offer results from brain-science in support of my claims.
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    language: English
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