Attentional progress by conceptual engineering.
Does conceptual engineering as a philosophical method deserve all the attention that it has been getting recently? The important philosophical questions, one might say, are about the world, not about what our concepts are or should be like. This paper fleshes out one way in which conceptual engineer...
| Publicado en: | Metaphilosophy Vol. 53; no. 2; pp. 254 - 267 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Apr2022
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=156617371&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 156617371 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00261068 9OM jtl: Metaphilosophy issn: 00261068 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Apr2022 vid: 53 iid: 2 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 156617371 10.1111/meta.12535 ppf: 254 ppct: 13 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 188KB tig: atl: Attentional progress by conceptual engineering. aug: su: Engineering Methods engineering sug: subj: Engineering Methods engineering keyword: agenda‐setting concepts concept elimination conceptual construction conceptual engineering ethics of attention philosophical progress revising concepts ab: Does conceptual engineering as a philosophical method deserve all the attention that it has been getting recently? The important philosophical questions, one might say, are about the world, not about what our concepts are or should be like. This paper fleshes out one way in which conceptual engineering can contribute to philosophical progress. The suspicion that conceptual engineering is getting too much attention presupposes that it is important to distribute our philosophical attention well (for example, conceptual engineering should not get more than its fair share). The paper's defense of conceptual engineering builds on that assumption. Conceptual engineering, it argues, is a way of configuring philosophers' patterns of attention for the better: it serves attentional progress in philosophy. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Metaphilosophy is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Metaphilosophy holder: Wiley-Blackwell dt: @attributes: year: 2022 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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