Beyond All‐or‐Nothing Approaches to Moral Expertise.
Are philosophers moral experts, and if so, what does this imply for their proper role in moral decision‐making? The dominant view on this subject argues that philosophers have superior moral understanding, but they are not better judges of what is morally right. Consequently, philosophers cannot and...
| Publicado en: | Journal of Applied Philosophy Vol. 39; no. 2; pp. 282 - 297 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
May2022
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=156617995&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 156617995 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 02643758 BQ0 jtl: Journal of Applied Philosophy issn: 02643758 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: May2022 vid: 39 iid: 2 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 156617995 10.1111/japp.12553 ppf: 282 ppct: 15 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 245KB tig: atl: Beyond All‐or‐Nothing Approaches to Moral Expertise. aug: su: Psychological literature Expertise Philosophers sug: subj: Psychological literature Expertise Philosophers ab: Are philosophers moral experts, and if so, what does this imply for their proper role in moral decision‐making? The dominant view on this subject argues that philosophers have superior moral understanding, but they are not better judges of what is morally right. Consequently, philosophers cannot and should not have an authoritative role in moral decision‐making. In this article, I challenge this view and argue that an examination of the intimate connection between two capacities – to understand and to judge – reveals that it is both inconsistent and simplistic. It is inconsistent because, all things being equal, if philosophers better understand moral problems, they are also better judges of them. It is simplistic because it adopts an all‐or‐nothing approach to moral expertise, while expertise is in fact conditional. Inspired by the psychological literature on expertise, I claim that we should not ask whether philosophers are moral experts but rather under which conditions they successfully execute their expertise. The conclusion of the dominant view needs to be reconsidered to reflect the conditional nature of philosophers' expertise. Although more empirical research is required, I offer several hypotheses for future endeavours that demonstrate what a conditional view of philosophers' moral expertise could look like. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Journal of Applied Philosophy is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Journal of Applied Philosophy holder: Wiley-Blackwell dt: @attributes: year: 2022 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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