Infinite frequency principles of direct inference.

According to an infinite frequency principle, it is rational, under certain conditions, to set your credence in an outcome to the limiting frequency of that outcome if the experiment were repeated indefinitely. I argue that most infinite frequency principles are undesirable in at least one of the fo...

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Publicado en:Synthese Vol. 200; no. 2; pp. 1 - 23
Autor principal: Ackermans, Lennart B.
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Springer Nature Apr2022
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        atl: Infinite frequency principles of direct inference.
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        au: Ackermans, Lennart B.
        affil: Erasmus School of Philosophy, Erasmus University Rotterdam, Rotterdam, The Netherlands
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      keyword:
        Bayesianism
        Direct inference
        Objective probability
        Principal principle
        Subjective probability
      ab: According to an infinite frequency principle, it is rational, under certain conditions, to set your credence in an outcome to the limiting frequency of that outcome if the experiment were repeated indefinitely. I argue that most infinite frequency principles are undesirable in at least one of the following ways: (1) accepting the principle would lead you to accept bets with sure losses, (2) the principle gives no guidance in the case of deterministic experiments like coin tosses and (3) the principle relies on a metaphysical property, ‘chanciness’, whose necessary and sufficient conditions are unknown. I show that a frequency principle that is based on the principal principle suffers from problems related to the definition of ‘chance’ or ‘chanciness’, which could lead to all three of the above problems. I introduce a version of the infinite frequency principle that does not rely on a notion of chance or chanciness and does not suffer from any of these problems.
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