Sąmonės apibrėžimų formulavimas metodologiniu realizmo pagrindu.
In this paper, the traditional question - what is mind? - is suggested to be treated from the metareflective realist stance from which different determinations of consciousness could be apprehended as always instantiated and dependent on their definitions. Methodological differentiation between what...
| Publicado en: | Problems / Problemos Vol. 101; pp. 42 - 52 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Vilnius University
2022
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=156755882&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 156755882 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 13921126 3D4C jtl: Problems / Problemos issn: 13921126 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: 2022 vid: 101 pid: 16037 pub: Vilnius University artinfo: ui: 156755882 10.15388/Problemos.101.4 ppf: 42 ppct: 10 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 1.4MB tig: atl: Sąmonės apibrėžimų formulavimas metodologiniu realizmo pagrindu. aug: au: Diržys, Adas affil: Vytauto Didžiojo universitetas su: Philosophy of mind Consciousness Myth Definitions Ontology sug: subj: Philosophy of mind Consciousness Myth Definitions Ontology keyword: consciousness methodology ontology philosophy of mind realism metodologija ontologija realizmas sąmonė sąmonės filosofija ab: In this paper, the traditional question - what is mind? - is suggested to be treated from the metareflective realist stance from which different determinations of consciousness could be apprehended as always instantiated and dependent on their definitions. Methodological differentiation between what is representational and what is non-representational is expressed as a divergence between particular definitions of consciousness and the ontological X, in this context, acting as a universality of consciousness. The derivation of this position is reached through the investigation of François Laruelle's non-standard philosophy, Wilfrid Sellars's critique of the myth of the given and Iain Hamilton Grant's revisionary study of Schelling's naturphilosophie. Šiame straipsnyje tradicinis klausimas „kas yra sąmonė?" yra siūlomas traktuoti iš metareflektyvios realistinės pozicijos, iš kurios skirtingi sąmonės apibrėžimai galėtų būti suvokiami kaip nuolatos instancijuoti ir priklausomi nuo jų determinacijų. Metodologinė diferenciacija tarp to, kas yra reprezentuojama, ir to, kas nėra reprezentuojama, yra išreiškiama kaip skirtumas tarp partikuliarių sąmonės apibrėžimų ir ontologinio X, šiame kontekste atliekančio sąmonės universalumo vaidmenį. Tokia autoriaus pozicija straipsnyje yra grindžiama analizuojant François Laruelle'io nestandartinę filosofiją, Wilfrido Sellarso duotybės mito kritiką ir Iaino Hamiltono Granto revizinės Schellingo naturphilosophie studiją. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: Lithuanian refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Problems / Problemos is the property of Vilnius University and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Problems / Problemos holder: Vilnius University dt: @attributes: year: 2022 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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