Externalism, transparency, and diagonal propositions.
Boghossian (Philos Perspect 8:33–50, 1994) argued (a) that externalism is incompatible with a transparency thesis according to which we can know a priori whether any two of our occurrent thoughts have the same or distinct content, and (b) that this transparency thesis is integral to our commonsense...
| Publicado en: | Synthese Vol. 200; no. 3; pp. 1 - 26 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Jun2022
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=156757977&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 156757977 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00397857 4LI jtl: Synthese issn: 00397857 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Jun2022 vid: 200 iid: 3 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 156757977 10.1007/s11229-022-03679-x ppf: 1 ppct: 25 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 369KB tig: atl: Externalism, transparency, and diagonal propositions. aug: au: Bochner, Gregory affil: Département d’Études Cognitives, Institut Jean Nicod, ENS, EHESS, CNRS, PSL University, UMR 8129, Paris, France sug: keyword: Diagonal propositions Epistemic transparency Externalism Mental content Self-knowledge Two-dimensional semantics ab: Boghossian (Philos Perspect 8:33–50, 1994) argued (a) that externalism is incompatible with a transparency thesis according to which we can know a priori whether any two of our occurrent thoughts have the same or distinct content, and (b) that this transparency thesis is integral to our commonsense conception of rationality, which requires the apriority of our logical abilities. Stalnaker (Our knowledge of the internal world, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008) offered a detailed compatibilist response to Boghossian. Boghossian (Philos Stud 155:457–465, 2011) criticized this response, and Stalnaker (Philos Stud 155:467–479, 2011) replied. But the outcome of that important discussion remained unclear, partly because it was unclear how to understand the amended transparency thesis at which Stalnaker was gesturing. My aim in this paper is to settle the matter. I wish (i) to clarify the terms of the debate, also by highlighting the relevant commitments of Stalnaker’s two-dimensionalist account, and (ii) to show that his compatibilist response, which appeals to diagonal propositions, is unsuccessful. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Synthese is a copyright of Springer, 2022. All Rights Reserved. item: Synthese holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2022 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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