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The Making of Imago Hominis: Can We Produce Artificial Companions by Programming Sentience into Robots?

This essay discusses sentient robot (SR) research through the lens of suffering. First three kinds of suffering are considered: physical, psychological, and existential. Physical pain is shown to be primarily subjective, and distinctive psychological and existential sufferings probably do exist, whi...

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Published in:New Bioethics Vol. 28; no. 2; pp. 168 - 186
Main Author: Yue, Zishang
Format: Article
Published: Taylor & Francis Ltd Jun2022
Subjects:
Materialism
Robot programming
Robots
Online Access:View this record in EBSCOhost
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      dt: Jun2022
      vid: 28
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      pub: Taylor & Francis Ltd
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        10.1080/20502877.2022.2062945
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        atl: The Making of Imago Hominis: Can We Produce Artificial Companions by Programming Sentience into Robots?
      aug:
        au: Yue, Zishang
        affil: University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, UK
      su:
        Materialism
        Robot programming
        Robots
      sug:
        subj:
          Materialism
          Robot programming
          Robots
      keyword:
        love
        posthumanism
        reductive physicalism
        sentient robot
        Suffering
        love
        posthumanism
        reductive physicalism
        sentient robot
        Suffering
      ab: This essay discusses sentient robot (SR) research through the lens of suffering. First three kinds of suffering are considered: physical, psychological, and existential. Physical pain is shown to be primarily subjective, and distinctive psychological and existential sufferings probably do exist, which are neither reducible to neurobiological events, nor replicable through algorithms. The current stage of SR research is then reviewed. Many creative proposals are presented, together with some philosophical and technical challenges posed by other scholars. I then offer my critique of SR research, claiming that it is based on a superficial understanding of suffering and unjustified philosophical presuppositions, namely, reductive physicalism. Without the capability to suffer, robots probably cannot love in any real sense, and no meaningful relationship may be developed between such a robot and a human. Therefore, we are probably unable to produce sentient robots that can become our companions (friends, lovers, etc.).
      pubtype: Academic Journal
      doctype: Article
      src: R
    language: English
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