Is the brain an organ for free energy minimisation?
Two striking claims are advanced on behalf of the free energy principle (FEP) in cognitive science and philosophy: (i) that it identifies a condition of the possibility of existence for self-organising systems; and (ii) that it has important implications for our understanding of how the brain works,...
| Publicado en: | Philosophical Studies Vol. 179; no. 5; pp. 1693 - 1715 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
May2022
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=157212456&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 157212456 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318116 4L8 jtl: Philosophical Studies issn: 00318116 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: May2022 vid: 179 iid: 5 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 157212456 10.1007/s11098-021-01722-0 ppf: 1693 ppct: 22 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 348KB tig: atl: Is the brain an organ for free energy minimisation? aug: au: Williams, Daniel affil: Early Career Research Fellow, Corpus Christ College, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, UK Associate Fellow, Leverhulme Centre for the Future of Intelligence, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, UK su: Cognitive science Philosophy & cognitive science Self-organizing systems Predictive control systems Mechanism (Philosophy) sug: subj: Cognitive science Philosophy & cognitive science Self-organizing systems Predictive control systems Mechanism (Philosophy) keyword: Active inference Free energy principle Mechanism Predictive coding Predictive processing Process theories ab: Two striking claims are advanced on behalf of the free energy principle (FEP) in cognitive science and philosophy: (i) that it identifies a condition of the possibility of existence for self-organising systems; and (ii) that it has important implications for our understanding of how the brain works, defining a set of process theories—roughly, theories of the structure and functions of neural mechanisms—consistent with the free energy minimising imperative that it derives as a necessary feature of all self-organising systems. I argue that the conjunction of claims (i) and (ii) rests on a fallacy of equivocation. The FEP can be interpreted in two ways: as a claim about how it is possible to redescribe the existence of self-organising systems (the Descriptive FEP), and as a claim about how such systems maintain their existence (the Explanatory FEP). Although the Descriptive FEP plausibly does identify a condition of the possibility of existence for self-organising systems, it has no important implications for our understanding of how the brain works. Although the Explanatory FEP would have such implications if it were true, it does not identify a condition of the possibility of existence for self-organising systems. I consider various ways of responding to this conclusion, and I explore its implications for the role and importance of the FEP in cognitive science and philosophy. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Philosophical Studies is a copyright of Springer, 2022. All Rights Reserved. item: Philosophical Studies holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2022 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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