Seeing colours unconsciously.

According to unconscious perception hypothesis (UP), mental states of the same fundamental kind as ordinary conscious seeing can occur unconsciously. The proponents of UP often support it with empirical evidence for a more specific hypothesis, according to which colours can be seen unconsciously (UP...

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Publicado en:Synthese Vol. 200; no. 3; pp. 1 - 12
Autor principal: Zięba, Paweł Jakub
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Springer Nature Jun2022
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        10.1007/s11229-022-03687-x
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        atl: Seeing colours unconsciously.
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        au: Zięba, Paweł Jakub
        affil: Jagiellonian University, Cracow, Poland
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      keyword:
        Colour perception
        Consciousness
        Phenomenal overflow
        Unconscious perception
      ab: According to unconscious perception hypothesis (UP), mental states of the same fundamental kind as ordinary conscious seeing can occur unconsciously. The proponents of UP often support it with empirical evidence for a more specific hypothesis, according to which colours can be seen unconsciously (UPC). However, UPC is a general claim that admits of many interpretations. The main aim of this paper is to determine which of them is the most plausible. To this end, I investigate how adopting various conceptions of colour and perceptual phenomenal character affects UPC’s resilience to objections. This brings me to the conclusion that the most plausible reading of UPC is the one according to which the phenomenal character of colour perception (i) is constituted by colours qua primitive mind-independent qualities of the environment and (ii) is not essentially tied to consciousness. My conclusion not only identifies the most plausible interpretation of UPC, but also highlights and supports an unorthodox version of the relational theory of perception, which is a perfectly viable yet so far overlooked stance in the debate about unconscious perception.
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    language: English
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