How Do Managers and Shareholders Respond to Taxation? An Analysis of the Introduction of the UK Real Estate Investment Trust Legislation.
Corporate finance decisions, measurement of accounting profits, and market valuations are invariably made within the framework of a taxation system(s). Previous research indicates both ambiguity over the influence of taxation on managers' behaviour and limitations in the ability of shareholders to p...
| Publicado en: | Abacus Vol. 58; no. 2; pp. 334 - 365 |
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| Autores principales: | , , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Jun2022
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=157396955&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 157396955 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00013072 AUB jtl: Abacus issn: 00013072 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Jun2022 vid: 58 iid: 2 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 157396955 10.1111/abac.12239 ppf: 334 ppct: 31 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 330KB tig: atl: How Do Managers and Shareholders Respond to Taxation? An Analysis of the Introduction of the UK Real Estate Investment Trust Legislation. aug: au: Holland, Kevin Lindop, Sarah Abdul Wahab, Nor Shaipah affil: Cardiff Business School, Cardiff University, Cardiff, UK Aberystwyth University,, UK Taylor's University,, Malaysia su: Real estate investment trusts Stockholders Taxation Fiscal policy Tax laws United Kingdom sug: subj: United Kingdom Real estate investment trusts Stockholders Taxation Fiscal policy Tax laws keyword: Agency costs Complexity Investor sophistication Non‐tax costs Real Estate Investment Trusts Tax ab: Corporate finance decisions, measurement of accounting profits, and market valuations are invariably made within the framework of a taxation system(s). Previous research indicates both ambiguity over the influence of taxation on managers' behaviour and limitations in the ability of shareholders to process tax information. The establishment of the UK's Real Estate Investment Trust (REIT) regime in 2006 allowed quoted companies to opt out of company level taxation. We examine managers' and shareholders' responses, that is, their ability to process information. When compared with shareholders, managers demonstrated a greater knowledge of the legislation, and of its applicability. For example, managers appeared to pre‐empt the effects of the legislation. Our findings have implications for tax policy makers and taxpayers, acting as a warning of the potential downside of increased cooperation when trying to make more appropriately formed legislation. Further, managers appeared to be willing to trade off the interests of shareholders for their own personal gain, which is surprising given the visibility of the REIT conversion process and illustrates the limitations of shareholder control over managers' behaviour. We find shareholders were able to accurately assess the general effects of the legislation but were unable to identify specific companies likely to benefit. Without any increase in shareholder sophistication, concerns exist over the effectiveness of shareholders in acting as monitors of managers' decision making. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Abacus is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Abacus holder: Wiley-Blackwell dt: @attributes: year: 2022 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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