Can double‐effect reasoning justify lethal organ donation?

The dead donor rule (DDR) prohibits retrieval protocols that would be lethal to the donor. Some argue that compliance with it can be maintained by satisfying the requirements of double‐effect reasoning (DER). If successful, one could support organ donation without reference to the definition of deat...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Publicado en:Bioethics Vol. 36; no. 6; pp. 648 - 655
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Wiley-Blackwell Jul2022
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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      pub: Wiley-Blackwell
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        atl: Can double‐effect reasoning justify lethal organ donation?
      aug:
      su:
        Organ donation
        Social responsibility
        Brain death
        Transplantation of organs, tissues, etc.
      sug:
        subj:
          Organ donation
          Social responsibility
          Brain death
          Transplantation of organs, tissues, etc.
      keyword:
        double effect
        intention/foresight
        killing
        organ donation
        double effect
        intention/foresight
        killing
        organ donation
      ab: The dead donor rule (DDR) prohibits retrieval protocols that would be lethal to the donor. Some argue that compliance with it can be maintained by satisfying the requirements of double‐effect reasoning (DER). If successful, one could support organ donation without reference to the definition of death while being faithful to an ethic that prohibits intentionally killing innocent human life. On the contrary, I argue that DER cannot make lethal organ donation compatible with the DDR, because there are plausible ways it fails DER's requirements. A key takeaway is that the theories of intention and proportionality assumed in DER matter for its plausibility as a constraint on practical reasoning.
      pubtype: Academic Journal
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    language: English
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