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A solution to some grounding problems for relationism.

Let w, w, and w be three distinct worlds, each of which contains only a single point-sized material particle, and in each of which spacetime is: uniformly flat, constantly positively curved, and constantly negatively curved, respectively. By the relationist's lights, these worlds seem to be qualitat...

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Published in:Inquiry Vol. 65; no. 5; pp. 569 - 586
Main Author: McDaniel, Brannon
Format: Article
Published: Taylor & Francis Ltd Jun2022
Subjects:
Spacetime
Developing countries
Online Access:View this record in EBSCOhost
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      dt: Jun2022
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        10.1080/0020174X.2020.1712234
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        atl: A solution to some grounding problems for relationism.
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        au: McDaniel, Brannon
        affil: Department of Philosophy, University of Richmond, Richmond, VA, USA
      su:
        Spacetime
        Developing countries
      sug:
        subj:
          Spacetime
          Developing countries
      keyword:
        grounding
        Metaphysics
        relationism
        spacetime
        supervenience
      ab: Let w, w, and w be three distinct worlds, each of which contains only a single point-sized material particle, and in each of which spacetime is: uniformly flat, constantly positively curved, and constantly negatively curved, respectively. By the relationist's lights, these worlds seem to be qualitatively identical. Nevertheless, for each world, there are propositions concerning possible arrangements of material points that are true in that world, but false in the other two. I argue that, surprisingly, the relationist can ground these differences in the distinct non-modal and intrinsic relations that are instantiated in each of w, w, and w.
      pubtype: Academic Journal
      doctype: Article
      src: R
    language: English
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