Panpsychism, Emergence, and Pluralities: Reply to Bohn.

Einar Bohn [AJP 2019] has proposed a version of panpsychism on which consciousness is fundamentally a property of pluralities of basic objects. I argue that this pluralized panpsychism is structurally similar to emergentism, and faces the problem of explaining how a plurality of basic objects could...

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Publicado en:Australasian Journal of Philosophy Vol. 100; no. 2; pp. 419 - 425
Autor principal: O'Conaill, Donnchadh
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Taylor & Francis Ltd Jun2022
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Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        atl: Panpsychism, Emergence, and Pluralities: Reply to Bohn.
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        au: O'Conaill, Donnchadh
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        Panpsychism
        Animism
        Emergence (Philosophy)
        Consciousness
        Apperception
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          Animism
          Emergence (Philosophy)
          Consciousness
          Apperception
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        consciousness
        emergence
        panpsychism
        plural collective properties
        pluralities
      ab: Einar Bohn [AJP 2019] has proposed a version of panpsychism on which consciousness is fundamentally a property of pluralities of basic objects. I argue that this pluralized panpsychism is structurally similar to emergentism, and faces the problem of explaining how a plurality of basic objects could be a subject of experiences. Because of these issues, pluralized panpsychism is not a substantial improvement on orthodox panpsychism.
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