An experimental analysis of risk effects in attacker‐defender games.
This paper reports results of two‐person games in which a defender chooses between high and low alert states, and an attacker chooses whether to attack or wait. Low alerts and attacks are risky because successful attacks are costly for the defender and failed attacks are costly for the attacker. The...
| Published in: | Southern Economic Journal Vol. 89; no. 1; pp. 185 - 216 |
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| Main Authors: | , , |
| Format: | Article |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Jul2022
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | View this record in EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=157892640&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 157892640 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00384038 SEJ jtl: Southern Economic Journal issn: 00384038 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Jul2022 vid: 89 iid: 1 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 157892640 10.1002/soej.12574 ppf: 185 ppct: 31 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: C – @attributes: type: P size: 3.6MB tig: atl: An experimental analysis of risk effects in attacker‐defender games. aug: au: Holt, Charles A. Sahu, Ricky Smith, Angela M. affil: Department of Economics, University of Virginia, Charlottesville Virginia,, USA 1UpHealth, Boston Massachusetts,, USA Department of Economics, James Madison University, Harrisonburg Virginia,, USA su: Risk aversion Games Risk assessment Nash equilibrium Probability theory sug: subj: Risk aversion Games Doll, Toy, and Game Manufacturing Toy and Hobby Goods and Supplies Merchant Wholesalers Hobby, Toy, and Game Stores Risk assessment Nash equilibrium Probability theory keyword: attacker‐defender games bilateral conflict quantal response equilibrium risk aversion attacker‐defender games bilateral conflict quantal response equilibrium risk aversion ab: This paper reports results of two‐person games in which a defender chooses between high and low alert states, and an attacker chooses whether to attack or wait. Low alerts and attacks are risky because successful attacks are costly for the defender and failed attacks are costly for the attacker. The Nash equilibrium, even allowing for risk aversion, has the stark property that a reduction in the attacker's cost has no effect on the attack probability. In contrast, high attack costs are associated with lower attack rates in a laboratory experiment conducted with monetary payoffs. The empirical analysis is focused on explaining strategic behavior as it is affected by risk aversion and behavioral "noise" in strategic best responses. A model incorporating both of these features outperforms others. Generalized comparative static results for changes in attack costs and risk aversion are proved in the context of a nonparametric quantal response equilibrium. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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