Partisan competition authorities, Cournot‐oligopoly, and endogenous market structure.
The so‐called excess‐entry theorem establishes conditions guaranteeing that more firms enter a homogeneous Cournot‐oligopoly in equilibrium than a benevolent government prefers. We generalize the approach and analyze the behavior of a competition authority, which attaches different weights to the fi...
| Publicado en: | Southern Economic Journal Vol. 89; no. 1; pp. 238 - 271 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Jul2022
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=157892649&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 157892649 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00384038 SEJ jtl: Southern Economic Journal issn: 00384038 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Jul2022 vid: 89 iid: 1 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 157892649 10.1002/soej.12593 ppf: 238 ppct: 33 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: C – @attributes: type: P size: 3.4MB tig: atl: Partisan competition authorities, Cournot‐oligopoly, and endogenous market structure. aug: su: Partisanship Consumers Market design & structure (Economics) sug: subj: Partisanship Consumers Market design & structure (Economics) keyword: competition authority Cournot‐oligopoly excessive entry monopoly partisan objective competition authority Cournot‐oligopoly excessive entry monopoly partisan objective ab: The so‐called excess‐entry theorem establishes conditions guaranteeing that more firms enter a homogeneous Cournot‐oligopoly in equilibrium than a benevolent government prefers. We generalize the approach and analyze the behavior of a competition authority, which attaches different weights to the firms' and consumers' payoffs, with welfare‐maximization constituting a special case. The greater the importance of consumers, the less likely entry restrictions are, whereas a greater relevance of firms makes a monopoly more probable. The nature of entry restrictions also depends on the competition authority's instruments. The essential insights continue to apply if firms are heterogeneous concerning costs and the timing of output choices. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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