Taking Up Thagard's Challenge: A Formal Model of Conceptual Revision.
Thagard (1992) presented a framework for conceptual change in science based on conceptual systems. Thagard challenged belief revision theorists, claiming that traditional belief-revision systems are able to model only the two most conservative types of changes in his framework, but not the more radi...
| Published in: | Journal of Philosophical Logic Vol. 51; no. 4; pp. 791 - 825 |
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| Main Authors: | , |
| Format: | Article |
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Springer Nature
Aug2022
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | View this record in EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=157956644&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 157956644 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00223611 JPH jtl: Journal of Philosophical Logic issn: 00223611 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Aug2022 vid: 51 iid: 4 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 157956644 10.1007/s10992-021-09650-4 ppf: 791 ppct: 34 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 1.1MB tig: atl: Taking Up Thagard's Challenge: A Formal Model of Conceptual Revision. aug: au: Bozdag, Sena De Benedetto, Matteo affil: Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, München, Germany Fakultät für Philosophie, Wissenschaftstheorie und Religionswissenschaft, Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy (MCMP), Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Geschwister-Scholl-Platz 1, D-80539, München, Germany su: Conceptual structures Conceptual models sug: subj: Conceptual structures Conceptual models keyword: AGM postulates Belief revision Conceptual change Conceptual revision Thagard ab: Thagard (1992) presented a framework for conceptual change in science based on conceptual systems. Thagard challenged belief revision theorists, claiming that traditional belief-revision systems are able to model only the two most conservative types of changes in his framework, but not the more radical ones. The main aim of this work is to take up Thagard's challenge, presenting a belief-revision-like system able to mirror radical types of conceptual change. We will do that with a conceptual revision system, i.e. a belief-revision-like system that takes conceptual structures as units of revisions. We will show how our conceptual revision and contraction operations satisfy analogous of the AGM postulates at the conceptual level and are able to mimic Thagard's radical types of conceptual change. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Journal of Philosophical Logic is a copyright of Springer, 2022. All Rights Reserved. item: Journal of Philosophical Logic holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2022 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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