Taking Up Thagard's Challenge: A Formal Model of Conceptual Revision.

Thagard (1992) presented a framework for conceptual change in science based on conceptual systems. Thagard challenged belief revision theorists, claiming that traditional belief-revision systems are able to model only the two most conservative types of changes in his framework, but not the more radi...

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Published in:Journal of Philosophical Logic Vol. 51; no. 4; pp. 791 - 825
Main Authors: Bozdag, Sena, De Benedetto, Matteo
Format: Article
Published: Springer Nature Aug2022
Subjects:
Online Access:View this record in EBSCOhost
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        atl: Taking Up Thagard's Challenge: A Formal Model of Conceptual Revision.
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          Bozdag, Sena
          De Benedetto, Matteo
        affil:
          Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, München, Germany
          Fakultät für Philosophie, Wissenschaftstheorie und Religionswissenschaft, Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy (MCMP), Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Geschwister-Scholl-Platz 1, D-80539, München, Germany
      su:
        Conceptual structures
        Conceptual models
      sug:
        subj:
          Conceptual structures
          Conceptual models
      keyword:
        AGM postulates
        Belief revision
        Conceptual change
        Conceptual revision
        Thagard
      ab: Thagard (1992) presented a framework for conceptual change in science based on conceptual systems. Thagard challenged belief revision theorists, claiming that traditional belief-revision systems are able to model only the two most conservative types of changes in his framework, but not the more radical ones. The main aim of this work is to take up Thagard's challenge, presenting a belief-revision-like system able to mirror radical types of conceptual change. We will do that with a conceptual revision system, i.e. a belief-revision-like system that takes conceptual structures as units of revisions. We will show how our conceptual revision and contraction operations satisfy analogous of the AGM postulates at the conceptual level and are able to mimic Thagard's radical types of conceptual change.
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    language: English
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