Can predictive processing explain self-deception?
The prediction error minimization framework (PEM) denotes a family of views that aim at providing a unified theory of perception, cognition, and action. In this paper, I discuss some of the theoretical limitations of PEM. It appears that PEM cannot provide a satisfactory explanation of motivated rea...
| Publicado en: | Synthese Vol. 200; no. 4; pp. 1 - 34 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Aug2022
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=158027156&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 158027156 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00397857 4LI jtl: Synthese issn: 00397857 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Aug2022 vid: 200 iid: 4 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 158027156 10.1007/s11229-022-03797-6 ppf: 1 ppct: 33 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 355KB tig: atl: Can predictive processing explain self-deception? aug: au: Jurjako, Marko affil: Department of Philosophy, Division of Cognitive Science, and Centre for Mind and Behaviour, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Rijeka, Sveucilisna avenija 4, 51000, Rijeka, Croatia sug: keyword: Desires and Intentions Motivated reasoning Personal/subpersonal explanations Prediction error minimization Predictive processing Self-deception ab: The prediction error minimization framework (PEM) denotes a family of views that aim at providing a unified theory of perception, cognition, and action. In this paper, I discuss some of the theoretical limitations of PEM. It appears that PEM cannot provide a satisfactory explanation of motivated reasoning, as instantiated in phenomena such as self-deception, because its cognitive ontology does not have a separate category for motivational states such as desires. However, it might be thought that this objection confuses levels of explanation. Self-deception is a personal level phenomenon, while PEM offers subpersonal explanations of psychological abilities. Thus, the paper examines how subpersonal explanations couched in the PEM framework can be thought of as related to personal level explanations underlying self-deception. In this regard, three views on the relation between personal and subpersonal explanations are investigated: the autonomist, the functionalist, and the co-evolutionary perspective. I argue that, depending on which view of the relation between the personal and subpersonal is adopted, the PEM paradigm faces a dilemma: either its explanatory ambitions should be reduced to the subpersonal domain, or it cannot provide a satisfactory account of motivated reasoning as instantiated in self-deception. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Synthese is a copyright of Springer, 2022. All Rights Reserved. item: Synthese holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2022 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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