Safety and Necessity.
Can epistemic luck be captured by modal conditions such as safety from error? This paper answers 'no'. First, an old problem is cast in a new light: it is argued that the trivial satisfaction associated with necessary truths and accidentally robust propositions is a symptom of a more general disease...
| Publicado en: | Erkenntnis Vol. 87; no. 3; pp. 1081 - 1098 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Jun2022
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=158079762&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 158079762 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 01650106 5KZ jtl: Erkenntnis issn: 01650106 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Jun2022 vid: 87 iid: 3 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 158079762 10.1007/s10670-020-00231-6 ppf: 1081 ppct: 17 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 742KB tig: atl: Safety and Necessity. aug: au: Paterson, Niall J. affil: Helsinki, Finland su: Explanation Philosophy of science Safety sug: subj: Explanation Philosophy of science Safety ab: Can epistemic luck be captured by modal conditions such as safety from error? This paper answers 'no'. First, an old problem is cast in a new light: it is argued that the trivial satisfaction associated with necessary truths and accidentally robust propositions is a symptom of a more general disease. Namely, epistemic luck but not safety from error is hyperintensional. Second, it is argued that as a consequence the standard solution to deal with this worry, namely the invocation of content variation, fails. Third, it is considered whether the condition can serve some restricted theoretical role; the hypothesis is rejected. Finally, it is tentatively suggested that epistemic luck's hyperintensionality derives from its being an explanatory notion, and an analogy is drawn with failures of probabilstic conceptions of explanation in the philosophy of science. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Erkenntnis is a copyright of Springer, 2022. All Rights Reserved. item: Erkenntnis holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2022 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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