Hazardous Conditions Persist.
Some theories in the philosophy of time combine a commitment to the existence of non-present regions of spacetime with the view that there is a perspective-independent present time. We call such theories 4D A-theories. There is a well-known objection to 4D A-theories, as follows: 4D A-theories entai...
| Publicado en: | Erkenntnis Vol. 87; no. 4; pp. 1635 - 1659 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Springer Nature
Aug2022
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=158079790&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 158079790 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 01650106 5KZ jtl: Erkenntnis issn: 01650106 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Aug2022 vid: 87 iid: 4 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 158079790 10.1007/s10670-020-00265-w ppf: 1635 ppct: 24 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 671KB tig: atl: Hazardous Conditions Persist. aug: au: Deasy, Daniel Tallant, Jonathan affil: School of Philosophy, University College Dublin, Dublin, Ireland Department of Philosophy, University of Nottingham, Nottingham, UK su: Skepticism Philosophy of time Theory (Philosophy) Spacetime Objections (Evidence) sug: subj: Skepticism Philosophy of time Theory (Philosophy) Spacetime Objections (Evidence) ab: Some theories in the philosophy of time combine a commitment to the existence of non-present regions of spacetime with the view that there is a perspective-independent present time. We call such theories 4D A-theories. There is a well-known objection to 4D A-theories, as follows: 4D A-theories entail that the vast majority of subjects across time believe falsely that they are present. But if the vast majority of subjects across time believe falsely that they are present, we do not know that we are present. We call this the Epistemic Objection to 4D A-theories. In this paper we do two things: first (Sect. 2), we describe and assess a number of different versions of the Epistemic Objection. We argue that there is only one version of the objection—the version due to Russell (Noûs 51:152–174, 2015) that we call the Safety Argument—that does not rely on implausible epistemic principles which entail radical scepticism. Second (Sect. 3), we raise objections to the main strategies adopted by 4D A-theorists in response to the Safety Argument. We conclude that the Epistemic Objection—in the form of the Safety Argument—remains a threat to 4D A-theories. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Erkenntnis is a copyright of Springer, 2022. All Rights Reserved. item: Erkenntnis holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2022 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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