Psychology and Neuroscience: The Distinctness Question.
In a recent paper, Gualtiero Piccinini and Carl Craver have argued that psychology is not distinct from neuroscience. Many have argued that Piccinini and Craver's argument is unsuccessful. However, none of these authors have questioned the appropriateness of Piccinini and Craver's argument for their...
| Published in: | Erkenntnis Vol. 87; no. 4; pp. 1753 - 1773 |
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| Format: | Article |
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Springer Nature
Aug2022
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| Online Access: | View this record in EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=158079796&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 158079796 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 01650106 5KZ jtl: Erkenntnis issn: 01650106 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Aug2022 vid: 87 iid: 4 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 158079796 10.1007/s10670-020-00272-x ppf: 1753 ppct: 20 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 729KB tig: atl: Psychology and Neuroscience: The Distinctness Question. aug: au: Bantegnie, Brice affil: Institute of Philosophy, Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic, Jilská 1, 110 00, Praha 1, Staré Město, Czech Republic su: Philosophy of science Functional analysis Neurosciences Neuroethics Argument sug: subj: Philosophy of science Functional analysis Neurosciences Neuroethics Argument ab: In a recent paper, Gualtiero Piccinini and Carl Craver have argued that psychology is not distinct from neuroscience. Many have argued that Piccinini and Craver's argument is unsuccessful. However, none of these authors have questioned the appropriateness of Piccinini and Craver's argument for their key premise—that functional analyses are mechanism sketches. My first and main goal in this paper is to show that Piccinini and Craver offer normative considerations (on what functional analyses should be) in support of what is a descriptive premise and to provide some guidelines on how to argue for this premise. My second goal is to show that the distinctness question should be of great significance for philosophy of cognitive science. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Erkenntnis is a copyright of Springer, 2022. All Rights Reserved. item: Erkenntnis holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2022 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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